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WHEN PREDATORS BECOME PREY:  THE NEED
FOR INTERNATIONAL SHARK CONSERVATION
Holly Edwards*
As apex predators, sharks play a valuable role in maintaining
ecological balance in the world’s oceans.  Since the 1950s, inter-
national trade has increasingly exploited sharks for their meat and
fins.  Because of their slow reproductive rates, sharks have not
been able to compensate for their growing mortality rates, and
many species have experienced severe population depletions.  The
international community has responded by adopting shark
conservation measures through the International Plan of Action for
the Conservation and Management of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks), the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES), and the Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS).  How-
ever, these three agreements suffer from limited coverage of shark
species, difficulties in obtaining national implementation of conser-
vation measures, insufficient funding for research and training, and
black market trade in shark products.  These problems could be
addressed by using Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
(RFMOs) to manage shark fishing, imposing trade sanctions for
nonimplementaton, tightening enforcement, applying to inter-
national funding organizations for financial assistance, and
increasing public education and lobbying efforts.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Humans have long had a fear of sharks.  As one of the greatest marine
predators, sharks easily receive a reputation as killing machines; in reality,
however, sharks have far more to fear from humans than humans do from
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1. Jessica Spiegel, Even Jaws Deserves to Keep His Fins: Outlawing Shark Finning
Throughout Global Waters, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 409, 409 (2001).
2. International Shark Attack File (ISAF), ISAF 2005 Worldwide Shark Attack
Summary, http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/sharks/statistics/2005attacksummary.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
3. A Review of Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law 2001-02, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 367, 368 (2002); Peter Knights, Sharks at Risk, DEFENDERS, Winter 2002/03, at 13, 14,
available at http://www.wildaid.org/PDF/reports/SharksatRisk.pdf; Spiegel, supra note 1,
at 412; Todd Preston, Who’s the Real Killer?, E MAGAZINE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 18.
4. STEFANIA VANNUCCINI, SHARK UTILIZATION, MARKETING AND TRADE, (FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 389), § 5.1 (1999), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/X3690E/X3690E00.HTM.  Total world chondrichthyan
exports increased from 19,908 MT in 1976 to 78,652 MT in 2000.  CAMILLO CATARCI,
WORLD MARKETS AND INDUSTRY OF SELECTED COMMERCIALLY-EXPLOITED AQUATIC
SPECIES WITH AN INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION PROFILE (FAO Circular No. 990) at
Sharks (Chondrichthyes): Exports of Shark Commodities (2004), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5261E/y5261e08.htm#bm8.  Sharks are the most
commercially important fish of the class Chondrichthyes (the cartilaginous fish), to which
this statistic refers.  VANNUCCINI, supra § 1. See JOSE I. CASTRO ET AL., A PRELIMINARY
EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF SHARK SPECIES (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 380)
§ 1.1 (1999) (discussing reasons for increase in shark trade), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/X2352E/X2352E00.HTM. 
5. Andrew C. Revkin, Atlantic Sharks Found in Rapid Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2003, at A18.
6. Ichthyology at the Florida Museum of Natural History, Shark Biology,
http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/education/questions/Biology.html#apex (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
7. Mark D. Evans, Shark Conservation: The Need for Increased Efforts to Protect Shark
Populations in the Twenty-First Century, 10 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 13, 21 (2001).
8. Preston, supra note 3, at 19.
sharks.1  In 2005, there were only sixty-one confirmed cases of unprovoked
shark attacks on humans worldwide.2  Meanwhile, humans kill roughly 100
million sharks for their fins each year.3  The past three decades have
witnessed a dramatic increase in the international shark trade,4 resulting in
an estimated eighty-nine percent decrease in some Atlantic shark species,
such as the hammerhead.5
Given sharks’ place as apex predators in the marine food chain,6 their
disappearance from the world’s oceans poses a major ecological concern.
They play a vital part in maintaining ecological balance by weeding out sick
and unhealthy members of both predatory and prey species and leaving only
healthy members of those species to breed.7  As apex predators, sharks are
not used to mortality threats and thus do not naturally need high rates of
population growth to sustain their populations.8
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9. CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.
10. TRAFFIC, Shark Listing Proposals at the Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of
Parties to CITES, http://www.traffic.org/cop11/newsroom/sharks.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2007) [hereinafter TRAFFIC Shark Listing Proposals].
11. Sonja Fordham & Coby Dolan, A Case Study in International Shark Conservation:
The Convention On International Trade in Endangered Species and the Spiny Dogfish, 34
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 531, 552, 557–58 (2004).
12. Id. at 558.
13. CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.2.20.
14. Id.
15. Id.  Furthermore, recent landings have consisted of one to two year-old immature
sharks.  
16. U. N. Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], International Plan of Action for the Conservation
and Management of Sharks, 11 (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter IPOA-Sharks], available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/x3170e/x3170e03.htm.
17. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES], available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#II.
18. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23,
1 9 7 9 ,  1 9  I .L .M .  1 5  (1980)  [hereinafter  CMS] ,  a va i l a b l e  a t
http://www.cms.int/pdf/convtxt/cms_convtxt_english.pdf.
Their slow growth and maturation, long reproductive cycles, low
fecundity, and long life spans prevent sharks from adapting to rising
mortality rates resulting from exploitation by global fisheries.9  Shark
populations, increasing at the low rate of one to two percent each year,
cannot compete with the significantly larger rate of population decrease
caused by overfishing.10  In the case of the spiny dogfish, which increases
naturally at an annual rate of 2.3%, the 75% decline in reproductive females
since 1988 has led to a record low number of pups since 1997, as well as a
decline in pup size and survival rate.11  Taking into account the combination
of low reproductive potential and current fishing mortality rates, the
Regional Stock Assessment Review Committee (SARC) issued a projection
in 2003 forecasting a collapse of spiny dogfish stock.12  Thresher shark
populations face a similar threat.13  After the expansion of thresher fisheries
in the early 1980s, thresher populations have steadily declined.14  With
females giving birth to only four to six pups annually, the species has not
been able to keep up with the mortality rates from overfishing.15
In response to the disturbing trend of plummeting shark populations,
several international organizations have developed guidelines and
regulations to help conserve and manage shark populations throughout the
world.  The three international measures most relevant to shark conserva-
tion are IPOA-Sharks16 developed by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), CITES,17 and CMS.18  Each
agreement operates independently from the others, with its own strengths
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19. See Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 533 (“Listings on the CITES Appendices,
if adequately implemented as a complement to regional fisheries management, hold great
promise for stemming depletion of . . . sharks in international trade.” (emphasis added)). Id.
20. IPOA-Sharks, supra note 16, at 13 ¶ 16.  
21. Id. at 16, App. A Part II.
22. Id. at 13, ¶¶ 18-19.
23. IPOA-Sharks, supra note 16.  
24. IUCN Species Survival Commission’s Shark Specialist Group and TRAFFIC, The
Role of CITES in the Conservation and Management of Sharks, ¶ 10, (June 2002)
[ h e r e i n a f t e r  T h e  R o l e  o f  C I T E S ] ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.cites.org/common/notif/2002/ESF042A.pdf.  Shark Plans provide a plan to
implement shark conservation measures, whereas an SAR provides an assessment of shark
stocks and the need for conservation measures.  IPOA-Sharks, supra note 16, at 13 ¶¶ 18,
21.  At the FAO Expert Consultation in December 2005, participants noted that while some
progress has been made since 2004, implementation of IPOA-Sharks remained patchy and
was not considered a priority by many nations. Shark Working Group of the CITES Animals
Committee, July 7-13, 2006, Trade-related Threats to Sharks, ¶ 26, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/com/ac/22/E22-17-3.pdf.
25. Shelley Clarke, Trade in Asian Dried Seafood: Characterization, Estimation and
Implications for Conservation (WCS Working Paper No. 22) 34, 45 (Dec. 2002), available
and weaknesses. Although efficient implementation of each agreement
would allow all three to act in concert to improve shark conservation, none
of the agreements are currently operating efficiently to protect shark
populations.19  The governing bodies must begin to address the weaknesses
in these agreements to increase their individual effectiveness and their
overall ability to protect sharks from the threats of international trade.
IPOA-Sharks is a voluntary measure designed by the FAO to promote
the conservation and management of shark populations worldwide, with its
ultimate focus on sustainable use.20  IPOA-Sharks applies to all shark
species and provides a framework for shark conservation and management.
It emphasizes the need for increased research on the biology and
identification of sharks, as well as increased record-keeping and reporting
of catch and trade data.21  IPOA-Sharks calls on countries, in whose waters
sharks are caught, to develop, implement, and monitor national plans of
action (Shark Plans) consistent with the framework of IPOA-Sharks.22
Although the language used in IPOA-Sharks urges states to implement its
recommended measures, it provides neither rewards for those states that
cooperate nor sanctions against those that do not.23  As a result, few states
have bothered to fully implement Shark Plans—by October 2004 only 5 out
of 113 nations reporting shark landings to the FAO have developed either
shark assessment reports (SARs) or Shark Plans.24   Moreover, catch and
trade data that countries actually reported to the FAO are estimated to be
grossly inaccurate due to a combination of under-reporting of legal trade
and unreported black market trade.25  Analyses conducted by both internal
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at http://wcs.org/media/file/Workingpaper-entire.pdf. 
26. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4. See CLARKE, supra note 25, at 45 (conclusion
based on comparison with national customs databases that the FAO trade data
underestimates true trade quantity).
27. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
28. Lawrence Watters & Wang Xi, The Protection of Wildlife and Endangered Species
in China, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 508 (2002).  
29. CITES, supra note 17, art. II ¶ 4.
30. CITES Animals Committee, Oct. 2-14, 2004, Interpretation and Implementation of
the Convention Species Trade and Conservation Issues: Conservation and Management of
Sharks, 25 [hereinafter CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks], available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/13/doc/E13-35.pdf; CITES, June 14, 2006, Appendices I, II
a n d  I I I  [ h e r e i n a f t e r  C I T E S  A p p e n d i c e s ] ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.shtml.
31. CMS, supra note 18, art. II ¶ 2.
32. Id. arts. III-IV.
33. CMS, Feb. 23, 2006, Appendices I and II of the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals [hereinafter CMS Appendices], available at
http://www.cms.int/documents/appendix/Appendices_E.pdf.
and independent researchers have concluded that the total estimated catch
is likely twice that of the FAO recorded catch.26  Finally, successful
implementation of IPOA-Sharks suffers from insufficient biological
research, training, and enforcement of national Shark Plans due to a
shortage of funding.27  CITES, which restricts international trade that
threatens the survival of endangered species, faces some of the same factors
hampering implementation of IPOA-Sharks—reliance on national
regulations, insufficient funding and training, and black market trade.28
CITES’ ability to protect sharks is further limited because it extends
only to those species involved in international trade and listed on one of its
three Appendices.29  Currently, out of the 197 shark species identified as
endangered by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the CITES
Animals Committee, only three shark species are listed on Appendix II: the
great white, basking, and whale sharks.30 CMS, which was formed to
protect migratory species from endangerment, faces a similar limitation.31
Sharks are highly migratory species, and CMS thus has the potential to offer
them protection.  Yet CMS, like CITES, covers only those species included
in one of the two CMS Appendices.32  Unfortunately, the CMS Appendices
currently include only three shark species: the great white shark and basking
shark on Appendices I and II, and the whale shark on Appendix II.33
The general weaknesses of IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and CMS result from
limited coverage of shark species, difficulties in obtaining national
implementation of conservation measures, insufficient funding for research
and training at a national level, and black market trade in shark products.
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34. Revkin, supra note 5, at A18.  SUSIE WATTS, WILD AID, SHARK FINNING:
UNRECORDED WASTAGE ON A GLOBAL SCALE 2 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.wildaid.org/PDF/reports/shark_finning_report.pdf.
35. Revkin, supra note 5, at A18.
To address these shortcomings, the governing bodies of IPOA-Sharks,
CITES, and CMS must find ways to both compel and encourage states to
implement shark conservation measures and report shark trade data
accurately to the FAO.  The governing bodies can address issues of black
market trade by tightening enforcement through increasing supervision of
fisheries and by relying on RFMOs to help manage shark fishing.  The
governing bodies can mitigate funding problems by applying to the Global
Environment Facility for assistance in financing, training, research, and
enforcement programs.   Finally, CITES and CMS can increase their
coverage of shark species by acquiring more accurate data on shark biology,
populations, and trade; mitigating the effect of reservations on conservation
efforts; promoting public awareness; and increasing lobbying efforts
targeting parties to CITES and CMS.  By adopting these proposals, existing
shark conservation measures provided by IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and CMS
can more effectively afford sharks protection from overexploitation in
international trade.
Part II of this Comment provides a biological explanation of why sharks
are especially susceptible to overfishing.  Part III examines the threat of
international trade to shark populations—namely, directed catch for their
meat and fins, and bycatch in tuna and swordfish longline fisheries.  Part IV
describes current international measures promoting conservation and
management of sharks, focusing on IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and CMS.  This
section also discusses the shortcomings of these measures.  Finally, Part V
suggests several steps to more effectively implement existing shark
conservation measures.  Increasing the efficient implementation of existing
international shark trade regulations will allow the international community
to better protect threatened shark populations and retain a valuable marine
resource for future generations to enjoy.
II.  BIOLOGICAL FACTORS MAKING SHARKS 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO ENDANGERMENT
Shark populations have plummeted in recent years, with some species
experiencing a decrease of more than half of their population in the North
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico.34  A recent study indicates that
hammerhead populations have declined 89% between 1986 and 2000.35
Other species have fared little better, with thresher populations decreasing
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36. Id. Chart.
37. CITES Animals Committee, Apr. 8-12, 2002, Information Paper-Australia:
Conservation of Sharks-Progress, 1, (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter Information Paper-Australia],
available at http://www.cites.org/common/com/ac/18/E18i-01.pdf. 
38. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 532.  
39. Evans, supra note 7, at 21.
40. Preston, supra note 3, at 19.
41. TRAFFIC Shark Listing Proposals, supra note 10.
42. Id.
43. Id.  By contrast, most bony fish produce several hundred eggs at time.
Sharks—Lords of the Sea, Shark Reproduction, http://elasmophiles.tripod.com/id18.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007).




by 80%, great whites by 79%, oceanic whitetip by 70%, tiger sharks by
65%, and blue sharks by 60% during that same time period.36   As a result
of their declining populations, the IUCN Red List identifies seventy-nine
shark species “ranging from critically endangered to ‘lower risk near
threatened.’”37  These sudden and drastic population declines result from a
dramatic increase in the international shark trade and sharks’ unique
biological susceptibility to overfishing.38  
Given their place at the top of the marine food chain, shark populations
are not naturally abundant.39  Furthermore, their role as apex predators with
few natural enemies means that sharks cannot adequately compensate for
high mortality threats and the subsequent decimation of their populations
resulting from increased fishing.40  Compared with the bony fishes, the
target of traditional large-scale commercial fisheries, sharks are particularly
susceptible to the threats posed by intensive international trade.41  The life
cycle of cartilaginous fish, such as sharks, skates, and rays, is vastly
different from that of bony fish.42  Unlike bony fish, which tend to mature
early and reproduce at high rates, sharks grow slowly, mature late, and
produce only a few young following a long gestation period.43  
Many shark species experience extremely slow growth rates;
estimations of growth rates for some species range from fifteen to thirty
years to reach maturity.44  Sharks also have long life spans, and female
sharks generally produce only a few broods in a lifetime.45  The low number
of broods per female result from the combination of long reproductive
cycles and gestation periods, characteristics of most shark species.46
Because sharks are large and fully developed when born or hatched, their
gestation period must be long enough to provide sufficient time for
development—usually one to two years.47  Furthermore, the energy required
312 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.  There are some exceptions where certain shark
species produce dozens of pups per brood.  Most commercially important species, however,
produce less than a dozen pups at a time.  Id.
51. Id. § 4.2.4.
52. Preston, supra note 3, at 19.
53. TRAFFIC Shark Listing Proposals, supra note 10.
54. Information Paper-Australia, supra note 37, at 1; CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.
55. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3; CATARCI, supra note 4, at Sharks (Chondrichthyes):
An introduction to chondrychthyans.  Catarci’s trade figures appear in Metric Tons (MT),
and have been converted to tons for ease of comparison to those figures which appear in the
Vannuccini report.
56. See VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, §§ 6.1–6.2 (discussing market for meat and fins);
Spiegel, supra note 1, at 432–35 (discussing threats of bycatch and shark finning).  Sharks
for female sharks to produce and nurture their large pups results in a long
reproductive cycle, which also lasts an average of one to two years.48  In
cases where the gestation period and reproductive cycle run consecutively,
the result could be a period of two to four years between broods.  For
example, after giving birth, the black-tip shark enters a year-long resting
stage to store energy before mating again and beginning a year-long
gestation period.49  The resulting broods are very small, usually containing
only two to twelve pups.50  This is the case for most of the commercially
important species, including the spiny dogfish, which produces broods
consisting of three to eleven pups following a gestation period of up to
twenty-two months.51  In addition, “young [sharks] suffer an infant
mortality rate of up to 80[%],” further contributing to sharks’ slow
population growth.52
As a result, populations of shark species, such as great white sharks and
basking sharks, increase at a rate of only one to two percent each year.53
While this population growth rate is enough to sustain the population under
natural mortality levels, females have shown no ability to adapt to the
increased mortality rates resulting from expansion of the shark trade.54
III.  THREATS
Although commercial fishermen have not traditionally targeted sharks
on a large scale, fishers around the world have shown an increasing interest
in sharks over the past thirty years.  As a result, threats facing sharks have
grown dramatically, with total shark catches increasing from 271,800 tons
in 1950 to 913,115 tons in 2000.55  Shark products are used for a variety of
purposes, but international trade poses its greatest threat to sharks in the
form of directed catch for meat, shark finning, and bycatch.56
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are also targeted for trophy items such as teeth and jaws, leather products, and various
medicinal uses.  VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, §§ 4, 6.4.
57. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 6.1.5.  Press Release, TRAFFIC, Shark Fisheries and Trade in the Americas
(Mar. 1998), available at http://www.traffic.org/factfile/us-shark_trade.html.
60. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.5.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 6.1.3. For example, in Japan, Canada, the United States, and the former USSR,
the shark meat industry received government assistance in product development and testing.
Id.
64. Id. The FAO statistics, however, are suspected to grossly underestimate actual
amounts of shark products in trade due to under-reporting by individual countries.
A.  The Effect of Trade in Shark Meat on Shark Populations
1.  History of Trade in Shark Meat
Other than in coastal areas, sharks traditionally have not been prized for
their meat.57  Until the late twentieth century, many parts of the world
looked down upon consumption of shark meat, viewing it as “poor man’s
food.”58  Because of high levels of urea in the sharks’ blood, the meat had
a strong smell and taste that made it unpalatable to many consumers.59  With
proper preparation and handling, however, fishermen could remove the urea
and prevent the offensive odor and taste.60  The coastal communities that
relied on shark meat as a food source dealt with the problem by drying,
smoking, or salting the meat when they could not eat it fresh.61  Improved
preservation resulting from the advent of more sophisticated refrigeration
and handling techniques in the 1950s made shark meat more acceptable to
non-traditional communities.62  In response to widespread malnutrition and
a decrease in traditional protein sources, several governments developed
marketing campaigns to promote shark meat consumption, pushing shark
meat into the mainstream.63
Since the 1950s, the world’s commercial fishing operations have
targeted sharks for their meat at a steadily growing pace.  Data collected
since 1976 indicate that total world production of shark meat, including
fresh, frozen, and cured meat and fillets, rose from 18,000 tons in 1976 to
69,300 tons in 1997.64  Similarly, the FAO statistics indicate that exports of
shark meat have increased from 17,600 tons in 1976 to 58,600 tons in
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65. Id. Spain, a leading exporter, alone exported 12,400 tons.  Id.  Other leading
exporters include Germany and the United Kingdom.  TRAFFIC, SHARK FISHERIES AND
TRADE IN EUROPE (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.traffic.org/factfile/sharks-
tradeineurope.html.
66. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.3.  The higher number of total imports over exports
can likely be attributed to the acknowledged inaccuracy of the FAO statistics resulting from
under-reporting.
67. Id. § 6.1.3.3.  According to the FAO statistics, Asian countries produced a total of
33,000 tons of shark meat and fillets in 1997.  Id.  Pakistan produced the most dried, salted,
or in-brine shark in the world in 1997, totaling 19,000 tons; Spain produced the most frozen
whole shark with 12,100 tons, and the United States led in the production of shark fillets,
producing 4400 tons.  Id. § 6.1.3.  African countries also participate in the shark meat trade,
although on a smaller scale.  In 1997, the FAO reports that Africa’s leading shark meat
producer, South Africa, produced a total of 123 tons, followed by Madagascar with only 37
tons.  Id. § 6.1.3.1. 
68. Id. § 6.1.3 fig. 28.
69. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.3.2.  Spain exports the most shark meat of all shark
meat-producing countries, exporting 12,400 tons in 1997.  Id. § 6.1.3.  Besides Spain, lead
exporters include the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Taiwan, New
Zealand, and Indonesia.  Id.
70. Id. §§ 6.1.3 fig. 29, 6.1.3.2.  Italy is the largest importing country, importing a total
of 14,400 tons of shark meat.  Id. § 6.1.3.2; TRAFFIC, SHARK FISHERIES AND TRADE IN
EUROPE, supra note 65.  France and Spain were the second and third largest importers,
importing approximately 7500 tons each.  VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.3.2.  Other
major importers include the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Republic of Korea,
the United States, and Japan.  Id. § 6.1.3. 
71. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.1.2.
1997.65  Finally, the FAO reports that imports have increased between 1976
and 1997 from 20,500 tons to 65,800 tons.66 
Shark meat production is an international industry with major
producing countries on nearly every continent—including Spain, the United
States, Mexico, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Chile, and New Zealand.  Asia
produces the most shark meat and fillets; in 1996, shark catches by Asian
countries represented 55.4% of the world’s total shark landings.67  While
Asia leads the world in shark meat production, Europe is by far the biggest
regional exporter.68  In 1997, shark product exports from Europe totaled
25,300 tons.69  Europe is also the world’s largest importer of shark meat,
importing nearly 40,200 tons in 1997.70  
2.  Impact of the Shark Meat Trade on Shark Populations
Species of shark most sought after for their meat include the shortfin
mako, thresher, porbeagle, spiny dogfish, smoothhound, blue, salmon, and
requiem sharks.71  International trade has severely affected these species.
For example, the spiny dogfish catch has nearly doubled in the last fifty
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72. Id. § 3.1.  Catch peaked in 1987 at 57,100 tons.  Id.
73. TRAFFIC, SHARK FISHERIES AND TRADE IN EUROPE, supra note 65. 
74. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 558.
75. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 25.
76. CATARCI, supra note 4, at Sharks (Chondrichthyes): Main commercially-exploited
shark species: Porbeagle (Lamna nasus).
77. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No.
103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS],  available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
78. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 26.
79. Id.
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 25-27.
82. Id.
83. CLARKE,  supra note 25, at 17.  Shark finning refers to the removal of the fins and
tail from a shark, after which the shark is discarded into the sea.  Spiegel, supra note 1, at
410.
years, increasing from 22,200 tons in 1950 to 44,100 tons in 1997.72
Between 1988 and 1994, dogfish composed 55% of European imports of
shark meat, which totaled 261,400 tons.73  In response to SARC’s projection
of stock collapse for the spiny dogfish due to overfishing, international
agencies are starting to manage this species.74  Because IUCN listed the
spiny dogfish as near-threatened/threatened, it is currently under
consultation for inclusion on CITES Appendix II.75  Porbeagle populations
have also diminished, as worldwide catch peaked in 1964 at around 10,664
tons and equaled 3468 tons in 2000.76  In response to its declining
population size, IUCN has listed the porbeagle as near-threatened/
threatened.77  While the porbeagle population currently receives almost no
management, it is under consultation for inclusion on CITES Appendix II.78
Mako populations also receive very little management and are declining.79
IUCN states that, while it lacks sufficient data on the species, the mako’s
status is near threatened.80  Of the other major targeted species, IUCN lists
the thresher, salmon, smoothhound, and blue shark as either near-threatened
or threatened, with declining populations, and either no or very little
management.81  None of these species are currently under consultation for
inclusion on CITES Appendix II.82
B.  The Effect of Shark Finning on Shark Populations
Shark finning is one of the greatest causes of shark mortality.83  While
sometimes the shark is already dead when the fins are removed, fishermen
sometimes slice the shark’s fins from its body while it is still alive,
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84. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 410.
85. Id.  Alternatively, the finned shark may be eaten by another predator.  Id.
86. A Review of Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law 2001-02, supra note 3, at 368.
87. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 411.
88. Shark Fin Culture, SHANGHAI DAILY, July 27, 2004, available at
http://www.sharktrust.org/news_view.asp?did=391&monthid=7&yearid=2004&toptab=4.
89. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.
90. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 411.
91. Id.
92. Evans, supra note 7, at 20.
93. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 16.
94. Id.
95. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.
96. Id. § 6.2.8.  A later study published in 2002 notes that the FAO recorded total
rendering it unable to swim and eliminating any chance of survival.84
Because a shark must stay in motion in order provide its body with oxygen,
the shark slowly suffocates to death when deprived of the ability to swim.85
Due to the growing popularity of shark-fin soup, over 100 million sharks
meet this fate each year.86
1.  History of Trade in Shark Fins
The Chinese have valued shark fins as the key ingredient of shark-fin
soup since the Han Dynasty more than 2200 years ago.87  Only a small
quantity of fin can be harvested from a shark, with the fins of one shark able
to serve only eight people.88  As a result, the Chinese viewed shark fins as
rare and precious items fit for consumption by emperors, considering them
one of the eight treasured foods from the sea.89  With the liberalization of
the People’s Republic of China in the 1980s, the Chinese economy grew by
leaps and bounds, resulting in a general trend of upward mobility for the
Chinese.90  As the income of the average Chinese citizen rose, the shark fin
industry expanded to accommodate the growing demand for shark-fin
soup.91  Shark-fin soup remains a popular dish today and is often served at
weddings in China and Hong Kong.92  In 2002, 85% of surveyed Hong
Kong residents had eaten the soup once in the past year; 46% had eaten it
at least five times during that same period.93
The Chinese have historically obtained shark fins through international
trade; records indicate that shark fins were part of the traditional economy
of Borneo, one of China’s historical trading partners.94  Today, fins are
almost exclusively exported through international trade to Chinese markets,
with very little domestic consumption in producing countries.95
In 1976, the FAO reports that total world production of shark fins was
only 1800 tons; twenty years later, the total had increased to 6030 tons.96
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production in 1999 as 3933 tons.  CLARKE, supra note 25, at 44.
97. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.8.
98. Id. § 6.2.8.2.  In 1997, the leading producer was China (2400 tons), followed by India
and Indonesia.  Id. § 6.2.8.
99. Id. § 6.2.8 fig. 51 and 52.  Asian countries represent both the largest importers and
exporters of shark fins because countries will often import the fins for processing and then
re-export the fins; Japan, for instance, re-exports the majority of its imported shark fin, with
very little domestic consumption.  Id. § 6.2.8.2.  Re-exports refers to the practice of
exporting goods which have themselves been imported into the exporting country.
100. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, §§ 6.2.8, 6.2.8.2.  This figure represents an increase from
the 1976 figure of 2480 tons and is a combination of exports and re-exports.  In 1997, re-
exports amounted to 1950 tons out of the total Asian export of 6150 tons.  Id. § 6.2.8.2.
Once again China was the leading country, exporting 2400 tons, followed by Hong Kong
(1955 tons), Indonesia (680 tons), Japan (370 tons), Taiwan (260 tons), and India (244 tons).
Id.  Until 1994, Singapore was also a leading exporter; after 1994, however, Singapore failed
to report its trade data to the FAO.  Id.
101. Id. § 6.2.8.
102. Id.  China again led other Asian countries and the world in imports, importing 4400
tons in 1997.  Id.  The other major importing countries were Hong Kong (2200 tons),
Malaysia (120 tons), Indonesia (98 tons), Thailand (60 tons), and Taiwan (36 tons).  Id.  The
greater quantity of shark fin imports compared with exports can best be attributed to
inaccurate reporting to the FAO.  See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
103. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.4.
104. Id. § 3.1.  
105. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 26-27.
106. Shark Finning and Coral Reef Preservation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Asia dominates the shark fin production industry.97  Of the 6030 tons
produced in 1997, nearly 5900 were produced in Asia.98  The FAO also
names Asia as both the world’s largest regional exporter and importer of
shark fins.99  Asian countries exported 6150 tons out of the world total of
6300 tons in 1997,100 accounting for 98.1% of the world’s total shark fin
exports.101  Out of the 1997 total world import of 7025 tons, Asian countries
accounted for 6930 tons—98.6% of the world’s total imports.102
2.  Impact of Shark Finning on Shark Populations
Shark species targeted for their fins include the giant guitarfish, blue,
dusky, hammerhead, mako, oceanic whitetip, and sandbar sharks.103  The
expanding fin market caused these species to suffer great losses.  The blue
shark, for instance, is caught at a rate of about 6.5 million fish each year as
undirected bycatch.104  Each of these species is managed inadequately or not
at all, has experienced declining stocks, and is listed on the IUCN Red List
as either near-threatened or threatened.105
Shark finning is also exceedingly wasteful.  Shark fins compose at most
5% of the shark’s total weight.106  Only the fin is retained; fishers discard
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Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Robert E. Hueter, Director, Center for Shark Research, Mote Marine
Laboratory) [hereinafter Hueter].
107. Id.
108. See id.; VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.8 (stating 1997 world total fin production
as 6030 tons, which is five percent of 120,600).  
109. Hueter, supra note 106.  Blue sharks caught as bycatch otherwise have a fair chance
of survival.  Id.  
110. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 17, 26.
111. CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 1.1.  See Evans, supra note 7, at 16 (describing
bycatch).
112. Evans, supra note 7, at 16.
113. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 432-33.
114. Id. at 432.  Data from Hawaiian longline fisheries indicates that eighty-six percent
of sharks caught as bycatch were alive when brought onboard; Brazilian longline fisheries
similarly observed that eighty-eight percent of sharks caught as bycatch were alive when
brought onboard.  WATTS, supra note 34, at 14.
115. While most documented statistics on shark bycatch relate to the blue shark, other
species are affected by the practice.  Because of the difficulty of determining the species of
shark from detached and dried fins alone, it is almost impossible to discern which species
are hardest hit by the increased practice of finning sharks caught as bycatch.  Spiegel, supra
the meat, skin, organs, and other body parts.107  This means that the 6030
tons of shark fins produced worldwide in 1997 represents approximately
120,600 tons of discarded shark.108  Blue shark finning provides a
particularly wasteful example because its fins are not even considered of the
highest quality; fishermen keep them simply because the huge number of
blue sharks taken as bycatch makes them an easy target.109  In spite of the
wastefulness of shark finning, current trends indicate that the steady
increase in the shark trade observed between 1984 and 2000 is likely to
continue growing, as demand for shark fins in mainland China is expected
to continue increasing.110
C.  The Effect of Bycatch on Shark Populations
Bycatch in tuna and swordfish longline fisheries, which occurs when
sharks are accidentally caught in nets or on fishing lines set out for other
fish stocks, also threatens sharks.111  Before the shark-fin soup craze began,
fishermen usually discarded sharks that were caught as bycatch.112  As shark
fins grew in value, however, fishermen no longer released sharks, even if
still alive.  Instead, fishermen now bring the sharks onboard, fin them, and
discard the carcass.113  In 1998, for example, 60% of sharks caught as
bycatch were finned rather than released alive.114  The impact on shark
populations has been significant, with the case of the blue shark best
illustrating the impact of bycatch on shark mortality.115  Of that species
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note 1, at 435.
116. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.1.
117. Hueter, supra note 106.
118. Id.  Compared with other shark species, the blue shark has a relatively high survival
rate on pelagic longlines.  Id.
119. Information Paper-Australia, supra note 37, at 1; CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.
120. Evans, supra note 7, at 21; TRAFFIC Shark Listing Proposals, supra note 10.
121. Evans, supra note 7, at 21.
122. CITES, Nov. 7-18, 1994, Status of International Trade in Shark Species, available
at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/09/E09-17.pdf.
alone, approximately 6.5 million sharks were killed each year as bycatch
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.116  While the overwhelming
majority of blue sharks caught as bycatch are alive when brought onboard,
fishermen no longer have any incentive to release the sharks unharmed.117
Rather, these sharks, which would otherwise stand a fair chance of survival
if released, are now killed for their fins.118
D.  Implications of Continued International Trade for Shark Populations
The catch statistics and resulting decline in shark populations
demonstrates the devastating impact of international trade and overfishing.
The data further illustrates the unsuitability of targeting sharks for large
scale international trade. The slow rate of population replenishment
common to most shark species prevents them from successfully
compensating for the huge growth in shark mortality.119  Compared to
traditional bony fish targeted for meat, sharks have smaller starting
populations; they also reproduce at a much slower rate and on a much
smaller scale.120  If the international commercial fishing industry continues
to catch sharks at the current rate, shark populations will continue to
decline, and the oceans will lose a valuable apex predator.121  To prevent the
decimation of shark populations, international agencies must implement
effective regulation of the catch and trade in sharks. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL SHARK CONSERVATION MEASURES
As shark populations began to dwindle, the international community
began to realize that sharks needed some form of protection from over-
exploitation.  The first major step toward international shark conservation
came in 1994, when the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES CoP9) adopted a resolution called “Status of International Trade in
Shark Species,”122 which instructed the CITES Animals Committee to
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compile and review existing biological and trade data regarding shark
species.123  Additionally, CITES protects those shark species listed on one
of its three Appendices, which impose varying degrees of trade regulations
and restrictions.124  The second step occurred in 1999 when the FAO
developed IPOA-Sharks, which provides a framework for individual
countries to develop and implement national plans of action for the
conservation and management of sharks in their waters.125  The third source
of international protection available to sharks is CMS, which restricts
takings of migratory species listed on one of its two Appendices.126 
A.  IPOA-Sharks
1.  Structure and Scope of IPOA-Sharks
In 1999, the FAO developed IPOA-Sharks in response to the concern
over increasing shark catches and the subsequent threat to various shark
populations around the world.127  IPOA-Sharks also addresses the conserva-
tion and management problems arising from the lack of available identifica-
tion, biological, and trade data on sharks.128  IPOA-Sharks sets out to
promote the gathering and dissemination of data relating both to biological
characteristics and trade of sharks in the hope that such information will
better enable sustainable management of shark fisheries.129  To that end,
IPOA-Sharks provides a framework for individual nations to use in
developing Shark Plans.130
IPOA-Sharks recommends that the Shark Plan include a description of
the prevailing state of shark stocks and populations, fisheries associated
with sharks, and a management framework for enforcement measures.131
It also recommends that the Shark Plan state the objective of ensuring the
conservation, management, and long-term sustainable use of sharks.132
Specifically, IPOA-Sharks states that the Shark Plan should aim to: 
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Ensure that shark catches from directed and non-directed fisheries
are sustainable;
Assess threats to shark populations, determine and protect
critical habitats and implement harvesting strategies consistent with
the principles of biological sustainability and rational long-term
economic use;
Identify and provide special attention, in particular to
vulnerable or threatened shark stocks;
Improve and develop frameworks for establishing and co-
ordinating effective consultation involving all stakeholders in
research, management and educational initiatives within and
between States;
Minimize unutilized incidental catches of sharks;
Contribute to the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem
structure and function;
Minimize waste and discards from shark catches in accordance
with article 7.2.2.(g) of the Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries (for example, requiring the retention of sharks from
which fins are removed);
Encourage full use of dead sharks;
Facilitate improved species-specific catch and landings data
and monitoring of shark catches;
Facilitate the identification and reporting of species-specific
biological and trade data.133
IPOA-Sharks further recommends that the Shark Plan contain strategies for
achieving the objectives, such as ascertaining control of access to shark
fishing vessels; decreasing effort where the current catch is unsustainable;
and improving the utilization of the catch, the training for shark species
identification, and data collection and monitoring.134   Finally, IPOA-Sharks
recommends that each Shark Plan contain an SAR that provides a periodic
assessment of the status of shark stocks.135  IPOA-Sharks recommends that
SARs contain past and present trends for effort in both directed and non-
directed fisheries; physical and economic yield; the status of shark stocks;
existing management measures (namely control of access of fishing
grounds, technical measures, and monitoring); the effectiveness of those
management measures; and possible modifications of those measures to
increase their effectiveness.136
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137. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
138. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.  Sharks, rays, and chimaeras all belong to the class Chondrichthyes,
with sharks and rays in the subclass Elasmobranchii and chimaeras in the subclass
Holocephali.  ReefQuest Centre for Shark Research, Chimaeras—the Neglected
Chondrichthians, http://www.elasmo-research.org/education/shark_profiles/chimaera.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
139. IPOA-Sharks states that it was “elaborated within the framework of the Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries as envisaged by Article 2 (d).”  IPOA-Sharks, supra note
16, ¶ 10.  The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) itself received a modicum
of binding effect from two bodies of international law: UNCLOS and the Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas.  FAO, Oct. 31, 1995, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
art. 1.1 [hereinafter the Code] (discussing member states’ obligation to conserve living
resources and highly migratory species), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/
005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm.  See UNCLOS, supra note 77, arts. 61, 64; FAO, Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Art. III (Nov. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Compliance
Agreement], available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/Meeting/006/x3130m/X3130m00.pdf
(discussing flag states’ obligation to comply with conservation and management efforts).
While neither UNCLOS nor the Compliance Agreement speaks specifically to the actions
recommended in IPOA-Sharks, member states are still bound by the underlying principles
of conservation and management expounded in both of them.
IPOA-Sharks encourages all states in whose waters sharks are caught
or whose vessels catch sharks on the high seas to develop Shark Plans.137
It covers all species of sharks, skates, rays and chimaeras, and defines
“shark catch” to include directed catch, bycatch, commercial and
recreational fisheries, and other forms of taking sharks, whether targeted or
non-targeted.138 
2.  Problems with the Current Implementation of IPOA-Sharks
Given its broad scope, IPOA-Sharks has the potential to effectively
protect all sharks from overfishing, assuming that all shark-fishing nations
fully develop and implement the recommended Shark Plan.  As a voluntary
measure, however, IPOA-Sharks acts only as a recommendation with no
binding effect.139
a.  Lack of Development and Implementation of Shark Plans or SARs
While IPOA-Sharks’ broad scope gives it the potential to provide
effective protection to sharks if shark-fishing nations fully implement its
conservation and management measures, such implementation has not yet
been achieved.  As of October 2004, only 5 of 113 states have actually
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140. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 8.  See
Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 549 (stating that as of 2002, only 5 of 113 countries had
SARs or Shark Plans available for review).
141. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 6.  The three
major shark-fishing states not yet implementing IPOA-Sharks are Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and
China (Taiwan Province)—each of which lands more than 10,000 tons each year.  Id. at 7.
142. Id. at 2, 7.
143. Id. at 9.  TRAFFIC is a wildlife trade monitoring network designed jointly by IUCN
and the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) to assist with the CITES implementation.
TRAFFIC, About TRAFFIC, http://www.traffic.org/about/abt.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
144. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 9.  In the
words of one responding state, “[a]ssistance will be needed with training, capacity building
and research before it will be possible to implement the IPOA-Sharks.”  Id.  Additionally,
it noted that resistance from industry and lack of political will played a part in the lack of
implementation.  Id.
145. Letter from R. Shotton, Fisheries Department Focal Point for FAO’s IPOA-Sharks,
Marine Resources Service, to Dr. Marinus S. Hoogmoed, Chairman, CITES Animals
Committee 1 (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cites.org/common/com/ac/18/E18i-
07.pdf.  The FAO is equipped only to address general issues at a global level, providing
technical assistance through the provision of “information, manuals, [and] species
identification guides . . . .”  Id.  Actual plan formulation and implementation depends on the
means and resources available to individual nations.  Id.
146. Id.
147. IUCN Species Survival Commission’s Shark Specialist Group & TRAFFIC, Apr. 8-
12, 2002, Report on the Implementation of the International Plan of Action for Sharks, 3
drafted either a Shark Plan or an SAR.140  Thirty-two states, including three
major shark-fishing states, meanwhile, have reportedly taken no action at
all toward developing either shark conservation measure.141  Thus, although
forty-seven states, including eight major shark-fishing states, are currently
working towards implementation of IPOA-Sharks—twice as many as
reported progress in 2002—very little improvement in shark fisheries
management has occurred.142
In their 2004 appraisal of the effectiveness of implementation of IPOA-
Sharks, IUCN and TRAFFIC identified several causes for the lack of
implementation.143  First, they identified a lack of capacity and resources,
noting that all developing countries identified this factor as a major
constraint on implementation.144  The FAO acknowledges that it lacks the
ability to provide the needed financial assistance to individual states for the
development and implementation of Shark Plans.145   For the FAO to pro-
vide greater financial assistance to states, the FAO would in turn require
greater contributions from those member states with the capacity to help.146
Another factor contributing to the lack of implementation is the
voluntary nature of IPOA-Sharks and the resulting lack of incentive for
compliance.147  In its April 2002 report on implementation of IPOA-Sharks,
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151. Id. ¶ 17.
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153. Letter from the Secretary-General of the CITES Secretariat to the Assistant Director-
General of the Fisheries Department of FAO 1 (Apr. 14, 2003) in the CITES, Aug. 18-21,
2003, Implementation of Resolution Conf. 12.6 and Decision 12.47, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/com/AC/19/E19-18-2.pdf.
154. The Role of CITES, supra note 24, ¶ 10.
155. Id.
156. Report on IPOA-Sharks, supra note 147, Table 2b.
IUCN and TRAFFIC noted that, given the voluntary nature of IPOA-
Sharks, states do not feel obliged to implement its recommendations, and
few consider it a priority.148  Based on this observation, they concluded that
the FAO currently lacks the ability to ensure the sustainable management
of shark fisheries and stocks.149  This conclusion was reiterated in the
IUCN/TRAFFIC June 2002 report, which found IPOA-Sharks’ voluntary
nature responsible for the negligible progress made by shark fishing states
and RFMOs in implementing IPOA-Sharks.150
In spite of their discouraging findings, IUCN and TRAFFIC concluded
that if shark-fishing countries widely and effectively implemented IPOA-
Sharks, it would result in significant improvements in shark conservation
and management.151  A caveat accompanied this optimistic conclusion,
however.  Because of its voluntary nature, shark-fishing nations have not
widely and effectively implemented IPOA-Sharks, and thus countries have
not improved their capacity to manage and conserve sharks.152  Rather, as
the Secretary-General of the CITES Secretariat noted, the lack of progress
in implementing IPOA-Sharks has contributed to one member listing two
shark species in the CITES Appendices.153
b.  Insufficient Action under Implemented Shark Plans or SARs
Even where countries have developed Shark Plans, they have generally
proven inadequate.154  As of 2002, all of the Shark Plans reviewed by IUCN
and TRAFFIC failed to meet the standards recommended by the FAO.155
For instance, in their analysis of Japan’s Shark Plan, IUCN and TRAFFIC
found that the plan was very brief and fell far short of a comprehensive
Shark Plan.156  It provided only a brief discussion of sustainable fisheries,
minimization of incidental catch, minimization of waste, encouragement of





161. Report on IPOA-Sharks, supra note 147, at 13; FAO, Feb. 26-Mar. 2, 2001, Progress
in the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and Related Inter-
national Plans of Action, ¶¶ 17, 19 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/
meeting/003/x9187e.htm.
162. IPOA-Sharks, supra note 16, ¶ 21.
163. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4.  For instance, in 1995, 1996, and 1997, Singapore
failed to report both its shark fin import and export data to the FAO.  Id. §§ 6.2, 8.2.
full use, and species-specific biological and trade data.157  Japan did not
address at all the requirements of threat assessment, stock protection,
biodiversity protection, and improvement of data collection.158  Although
the United States provided a more detailed plan, IUCN and TRAFFIC still
concluded that it failed to commit to a particular course of action.159
Specifically, while the United States mentioned in its plan sustainable
fisheries, threat assessment, consultation initiatives, and biodiversity
protection, it failed to provide details on how it would achieve each
requirement.160  
The findings of IUCN, TRAFFIC, and the FAO indicate that the
problems resulting from the voluntary nature of IPOA-Sharks extend
beyond the widespread lack of implementation;  even where some form of
a Shark Plan is implemented, it is rarely thorough or effective.161  Without
some degree of uniformity in implementation and enforcement of IPOA-
Sharks, those shark-fishing countries without sufficient laws in place can
undermine the success of those who have developed and efficiently
enforced laws protecting endangered species in their jurisdictions.  For
instance, a shark that may be protected from finning in waters under the
jurisdiction of a country that enforces a ban on finning might still fall prey
to the practice when it swims into the waters under the jurisdiction of a
country with no such ban.
c.  Inaccurate Reporting of Catch and Trade Data by Shark-Fishing
States to the FAO
The effectiveness of IPOA-Sharks is further weakened by the
incomplete and inaccurate data reported to the FAO by shark-fishing states.
Under IPOA-Sharks, the FAO requests that states make their commercial
and species-identification data available to relevant subregional and
regional fisheries organizations and the FAO.162  However, many shark-
fishing states either under-report their shark catch or fail to report it
altogether.163  The number of total reported imports in 1997 represents the
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According to Singapore’s national customs database, Singapore imported 291 tons of
unprocessed shark fins in 1996 and 210 tons in 1997.  CLARKE, supra note 25, at 46.
Evidence also indicates that China—one of the world’s greatest shark fin importers—
severely under-reports its imports.  Id. at 7.  Furthermore, many countries fail to report the
number of sharks taken as bycatch.  VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4.
164. See Review of Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law 2001-02, supra note 3, at
368 (stating that 8000 tons of shark fins equates to roughly 100 million sharks).  Applying
a ratio of 7025 tons to 8000 tons, the corresponding number of sharks is roughly 87.5
million.
165. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4.
166. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 45.
167. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 554.
168. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 45.
169. See id. at 44.  The Clarke study noted that the FAO reported Hong Kong’s fin imports
at 13 tons in 1998 and 14 tons in 1999.  Hong Kong’s customs database, however, reports
that for those same years, Hong Kong’s fin imports were actually 5195 tons and 5824 tons,
respectively.  Id. at 46.  Similarly, in 1997, the FAO reported Hong Kong’s re-export total
as 1794 tons and import total as 2211 tons, while Hong Kong’s customs database reported
a re-export total of 5331 and an import total of 6526.  Id. at 45.
170. Id. at 49-50.  SEAFDEC’s data reflected shark imports and exports almost identical
to those found in Hong Kong’s customs database, while the FAO’s numbers were once again
significantly lower.  For instance, SEAFDEC recorded Hong Kong’s total imports in 1996
at 9212 tons; the FAO reported 2417 tons in 1996.  Id. 
171. Id. at 50.
deaths of approximately 87.5 million sharks.164  Yet evidence suggests that
these figures grossly underestimate the actual total tonnage imported.165  A
recent independent study (Clarke study) concluded that the FAO data set
regarding shark fin imports severely underestimates world trade in shark
fins as a result of deflated trade estimates for the People’s Republic of
China, Hong Kong, and other countries.166  Similar inaccuracies in the
FAO’s data exist regarding catch from the North Atlantic.167
The Clarke study compared the FAO data based on country reports to
the FAO, with those countries’ national customs databases, exposing huge
discrepancies between the two data sets.168   For instance, the FAO data
recorded Hong Kong’s 1999 fin imports as only 0.2% of the fin imports
recorded in Hong Kong’s customs database.169  A comparison between the
FAO data for Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand with data compiled by the Southeast
Asian Fishery Development Center (SEAFDEC) for the same countries
produced similar results.170  The comparison reemphasized the conclusion
that the FAO’s data significantly underestimates the true numbers involved
in the shark fin trade.171
The Clarke study noted that the discrepancies between the FAO and
customs databases for 1997 was likely due to the FAO’s exclusion of dried
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from 95,206 kilos in 2001 to 296,159 kilos in 2002.  Id. at 11.  This increase occurred in
spite of the implementation of a prohibition on finning in February 2002.  Id. at 10.
Although the magnitude of the problem is unknown, seizures conducted by the United States
government indicate that U.S. vessels have engaged in smuggling shark fins into the United
States for subsequent legal export.  For instance, the most recent seizure at the time of the
report confiscated 120,000 pounds of shark fins.  Id. at 12.
177. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 45.
178. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 411; VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 6.2.8.2.
179. The Role of CITES, supra note 24, ¶ 13.
180. VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4.
shark fin quantities, for which the customs data accounted.172  The Clarke
study provided another more sinister and problematic explanation of the
low numbers reported to the FAO: smuggling.  Comparing Hong Kong and
Mainland China trade data, the Clarke study noted that Hong Kong’s
recorded exports exceeded China’s corresponding recorded imports by 139
times.173   The Clarke study postulated that this difference resulted from a
lack of customs reporting on nondutiable goods in Mainland China.174  The
numbers—even those recorded in the customs database—are also likely to
underestimate the true quantities of shark fin trade due to smuggling.175  An
analysis of United States Customs data shows discrepancies that provide
further evidence of illicit trade in shark fins.176
While the Clarke study only compared data on imports, it implies that
the FAO data underestimates production and export data as well.177  It is
therefore likely that the shark fin trade is even more expansive than the
FAO statistics reflect, especially considering Hong Kong’s status as one of
the most important markets for fins in the world.178  The repercussions of
incomplete reporting of catch and trade data go beyond merely indicating
a lack of compliance with IPOA-Sharks; the inaccuracies also reduce the
data’s utility for fisheries assessment and management.179
As a result of the FAO’s reliance on the incomplete reports, the FAO
and other organizations that depend on the FAO statistics to gauge the
impact of international trade on shark populations are currently shaping
conservation policies and trade regulations based on inaccurate and deflated
data.180  For example, in 1995, the FAO’s data for both shark fin imports
and exports showed a sharp decrease due to China’s failure to submit its
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181. Id. § 6.2.8.
182. Id. § 3.4.
183. The Role of CITES, supra note 24, ¶ 13.  See also VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, § 3.4
(discussing how the FAO catch data only covers commercial, industrial, recreational,
subsistence, and artisanal fisheries, the last three of which are traditionally under-reported
to the FAO).
184. See VANNUCCINI, supra note 4, §§ 3.1, 3.4.
185. CITES, What Is CITES?, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml (last visited Feb.
25, 2007).
186. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 504.
187. CITES, Member Countries, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.shtml (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007).
188. Jay E. Carey, Improving the Efficacy of CITES by Providing the Proper Incentives
to Protect Endangered Species, 77 WASH. U.L.Q. 1291, 1294–95 (1999).
trade reports, although this apparent decline in trade does not mean that the
actual quantity of trade decreased.181  The end result of inaccurate reporting
under IPOA-Sharks is that the FAO, as well as other organizations relying
on FAO statistics, currently operate under false assumptions of the true
quantity of trade in shark products, as the total estimated shark catch is
likely twice that of the FAO recorded catch.182  Even to the extent that
shark-fishing states do report their shark trade accurately to the FAO, the
overall accuracy of the FAO statistics is limited in scope by its exclusion of
domestic consumption of shark products, thus skewing the picture of true
shark mortality.183  Finally, the lack of species-specific reporting makes it
difficult for the FAO or other conservation groups to identify species that
are particularly threatened by trade.184
B.  CITES
1.  Structure, Scope, and Current Application of CITES to Shark
Conservation
Beginning in the 1960s, the concept of using trade regulations for
conservation purposes began to gain acceptance, and the international
community started to realize that protecting certain species from
overexploitation would require international cooperation.185  In response to
these growing concerns, CITES was developed and entered into force on
July 1, 1975.186  It currently has 169 member countries (parties).187  CITES
serves a threefold purpose: to protect endangered species from
overexploitation in international trade in wildlife; to attempt to strike a
balance between preservation and economic and recreational demands; and
to foster cooperation between nations, as well as efforts of individual
peoples and nations.188  CITES regulates international trade in endangered
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189. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 535.  The CITES trade restrictions for listed
species applies to trade between member states. Furthermore, Article X includes a provision
for trade between parties and non-parties requiring that the party obtain from the non-party
documentation which substantially conforms with the Convention’s requirements for permits
and certificates.  CITES, supra note 17, art. X.
190. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 535.
191. CITES, supra note 17, art. II ¶ 1.




196. Id. art. III ¶ 3.  Regarding the import of live specimens, the importing state’s
managing authority must also be satisfied that the recipient has the capacity to care for it.
197. CITES, supra note 17, art. IV ¶ 1.
198. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 537.
species listed on one of its three Appendices using import and export
permits issued by the management authorities of trading parties.189  The
placement of a species on one of the CITES Appendices depends on both
the species’ population status and the degree of trade-related threat facing
it.190 
CITES reserves placement on Appendix I for species threatened with
extinction that are or may be affected by international trade.  In order to
protect them from further threats, CITES strictly regulates trade in those
species, prohibiting international trade for primarily commercial purposes
absent exceptional circumstances.191  The export of Appendix I species
requires the prior grant and presentation of an export permit which can only
be granted under certain conditions.192  First, the exporting state must obtain
advice from its scientific authority that such export will not prove
detrimental to the survival of the species.193  Second, the exporting state’s
management authority must be satisfied that the specimen was not obtained
illegally under the laws of that state.194  Finally, the exporting state’s
management authority must be satisfied that the importing state has
obtained a valid import permit.195  Similarly, the import of an Appendix I
species requires an import permit, subject to the conditions that the
importing state’s scientific authority has advised that such import is not for
purposes detrimental to the species’ survival, and that the importing state’s
management authority is satisfied that the import is not for primarily
commercial purposes.196
CITES also restricts international trade in Appendix II species,197 but
these trade regulations are much less restrictive, functioning more to track
and facilitate legal trade in its species.198  Species listed under Appendix II
include all species that, even if not currently threatened with extinction,
330 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
199. CITES, supra note 17, art. II ¶ 2.
200. Id. art. IV ¶ 2.
201. Id.  In cases where the exported specimen is alive, the exporting state’s management
authority must also be satisfied that it is shipped in a manner that will minimize the risk of
injury, damage, or cruelty to the specimen.  Id.
202. Id. art. IV ¶ 3.
203. Id.
204. Id. art. IV ¶ 4.
205. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 11, at 537.
206. Id.
207. To obtain an export permit, the Convention requires only that the exporting state’s
management authority be satisfied that the specimen was not obtained illegally under the
state’s laws.  This permit requirement, moreover, applies only to states that have included
the species on Appendix III.  CITES, supra note 17, art. V ¶ 2.  To import an Appendix III
species, the importing state must only obtain a certificate of origin and, if the specimen was
imported from a state that listed the species on Appendix III, a valid export permit from that
state.  Id. art. V ¶ 3.
208. See CITES, supra note 17, art. III-V (requiring approval of state’s scientific and
management authorities for issuance of permits).
may become so without strict trade regulation.199  For export of Appendix
II species, exporting states must have an export permit, subject to conditions
similar to those under Appendix I.200  Exporting states must obtain both the
advice of their scientific authority that such export will not prove
detrimental to the survival of the species and the satisfaction of their
management authority that the specimen was not obtained illegally under
the laws of the state.201  Furthermore, the scientific authority of each state
must monitor both the export permits granted and the actual export of
Appendix II species by that state.202  The scientific authority is also required
to inform the state’s management authority of recommended measures to
limit exports in Appendix II species in cases where maintaining that species
at a sustainable level requires a reduction in the number of exports.203  The
importation of Appendix II species also requires the prior presentation of
either an export permit or a re-export certificate.204
Unlike Appendix I and II listings that regulate trade, Appendix III
listings are imposed by individual parties and do not need approval by the
other parties.205  Appendix III listings draw attention to a species in need of
trade controls, with the hope of gaining international cooperation in the
conservation of that particular species.206  While the export of Appendix III
species also requires an export permit, the requirements for obtaining one
are less strict than for either Appendix I or II.207  The efficacy of the permit
requirements relies on individual parties for implementation.208 While
Articles III through V require a state’s scientific and management
authorities to make the appropriate permit findings before that state may
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209. Id. art. IX ¶ 1.
210. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 507.
211. Id.
212. CITES, supra note 17, art. XXIII ¶ 1.
213. Id. art. XXIII ¶ 3.
214. Id. art. XXIII.
215. Id.
216. See CITES, June 7, 2005, Specific Reservations Entered by Parties [hereinafter
CITES Reservations], available at http://www.cites.org/eng/notif/2005/E050607b.pdf.
217. CITES, Apr. 19-30, 1983, Effects of Reservations, Conf., 4.25 [hereinafter CITES
Conf. 4.25], available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/04/E04-25.pdf.
218. See id.
export or import specimens of a species listed on the Appendices, nowhere
does CITES hold these authorities separately accountable to the governing
body of CITES.  Rather, the issuance of permits through which CITES
regulates trade is left to the discretion of each party’s internally-appointed
authorities.209  Parties to CITES are bound to follow its provisions, and
CITES provides general guidelines for implementing those provisions.210
Nevertheless, CITES still depends on its parties for actual implementation
by enacting national legislation regulating trade in listed species and
enforcing those regulations.211
CITES generally binds its parties to comply with its provisions;
however, Article XXIII provides an exception by permitting parties to enter
reservations against specific amendments to the Appendices.212  Under the
reservation allowance, CITES treats parties who enter reservations
regarding a specific species listed on one of the Appendices as a non-party
to the Convention regarding that species until the party withdraws its
reservation.213  Regarding Appendix I or II species, however, parties are
subject to certain restrictions regarding when they may enter a
reservation.214  In such cases, a state may only enter a reservation against a
species either at the time they become a party or at the time when the
amendment is made adding the species to Appendix I or II.215  Reservations
have been entered against all shark species listed on the Appendices.216
In a case where a party enters a reservation against an Appendix I
species, CITES Fourth Conference of the Parties (CoP4) adopted the
recommendation that states entering such a reservation should treat that
species as belonging to Appendix II and maintain trade records in annual
reports so CITES can continue to monitor international trade in that
species.217  As a recommendation, however, it has no binding effect.  No
such recommendation exists regarding Appendix II species, which includes
all three shark species protected by CITES.218
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219. See CITES, Sharks, http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid13/13-42&43.shtml (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007), for a list and brief description of all current CITES decisions
regarding reviews of IPOA-Sharks implementation by the CITES Animals Committee and
Secretariat.
220. Report on IPOA-Sharks, supra note 147, ¶ 1.  Decision 11.94 was repealed at CITES
CoP12 and replaced with Decision 12.47, which is substantively identical to Decision 11.94.
CITES, Aug. 18-21, 2003, Implementation of Resolution Conf. 12.6 and Decision 12.47, ¶
9 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Implementation of Resolution], available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/com/ac/19/E19-18-2.pdf.
221. CITES, Implementation of Resolution, supra note 220, ¶ 3.  The proposed classi-
fication system would facilitate the accurate assessment of international trade in shark pro-
ducts by differentiating between shark meat, fins, leather, cartilage, and other products.  Id.
222. Id.
223. CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 15-20.  
224. Id. at 25-27.  This report provided an evaluation of the status and current
management of approximately 197 species of sharks, skates, and rays.  Id.
225. CITES Implementation of Resolution, supra note 220, at 5-6.  Additionally, the
Animals Committee has issued species-specific recommendations for the Spiny Dogfish,
Porbeagle Shark, White Shark, Freshwater Stingrays, Sawfishes, Gulper Sharks, Soupfin
Shark, Requiem Sharks, Guitarfishes, Shovelnose Rays, and Devil Rays.  CITES Animals
In addition to offering protection to those shark species listed on its
Appendices, CITES has promoted shark conservation efforts through its
review of IPOA-Sharks implementation.219  At CITES CoP11, the parties
issued Decision 11.94 directing the Animals Committee to cooperate with
the Secretary of the Committee on Fisheries of the FAO in monitoring the
implementation of IPOA-Sharks.220
Similarly, in Decision 11.151, the parties directed the CITES Secretariat
to liaise with the World Customs Organization to promote the development
of a tariff classification system to differentiate between shark products in
trade.221  At CITES CoP12, the parties issued two additional decisions
directed at the CITES Secretariat; Decision 12.48 directed the Secretariat
to urge the FAO to offer greater encouragement to states and RFMOs to
implement IPOA-Sharks, and Decision 12.49 directed the Secretariat to
encourage the authorities of CITES parties to obtain information on the
implementation of IPOA-Sharks from their national fisheries departments
and report back to the Animals Committee.222
The reports compiled in response to these decisions have provided
valuable information on implementation of IPOA-Sharks, identifying which
countries have developed either a Shark Plan or an SAR and further
assessing their adequacy.223  Furthermore, the reports provide an analysis of
the current status of sharks, including over 190 species that are not listed on
the CITES Appendices.224  Based on their findings, the Animals Committee
has issued recommendations to the parties to continue identifying
endangered shark species for inclusion on the CITES Appendices.225
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Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 21-24.
226. CITES Appendices, supra note 30.  CITES currently covers only the basking, whale,
and great white sharks on Appendix II.  Id.
227. See CITES Animals Committee, Management of Sharks, supra note 30, at 25-27.
Of the species reviewed in the report, all are involved in international trade except for
twenty-two species whose involvement in international trade is unknown.  Id.
228. CITES, supra note 17, art. XV ¶ 1.  If a party proposes the inclusion of a species on
either Appendix I or II between conferences, the proposal goes into effect ninety days later
unless an objection is submitted within thirty days of the proposed amendment.  Id. art. XV
¶ 2.  If an objection is submitted, then the amendment is put to a vote by mail, and the
species is only included after the proposal has been ratified by two-thirds of the voting
parties, assuming that votes are received from at least one half of the parties.  Id.
229. See CITES Reservations, supra note 216.  The parties entering reservations on listed
shark species are Iceland (basking and whale sharks), Indonesia (basking and whale sharks),
Japan (great white, basking, and whale sharks), Norway (great white, basking, and whale
sharks), Palau (great white and whale sharks), and the Republic of Korea (basking and whale
sharks).  Id. at 5.  For statistics on Japanese and Indonesian shark meat and fin exports, see
supra notes 75, 105-06 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 2, at 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing the CITES CoP4
recommendation).
2.  Problems with the Current Implementation of CITES Shark
Conservation Measures
a.  Limited Inclusion of Shark Species on CITES Appendices
The terms of the Convention demonstrate the potential to offer wide
protection to sharks should CITES include them on its Appendices.
Currently, however, CITES includes only three shark species.226  Because
CITES does not cover the other 194 endangered shark species recognized
by IUCN and the CITES Animals Committee, it fails to adequately address
the threat to sharks posed by international trade.227  Responsibility for this
limited coverage of shark species rightfully belongs to the parties.
Inclusion on the CITES Appendices requires a party-generated nomination
ratified by at least two-thirds of the parties present and voting.228  While the
Animals Committee can provide data on the status of shark species and
make recommendations for inclusion on the Appendices, it falls to the
parties to actually propose and ratify the inclusion.
Even those shark species currently listed on the CITES Appendices do
not receive sufficient protection because a total of six parties including
Japan and Indonesia—both major exporters of shark products—have
entered reservations on all three species.229  Moreover, all three species are
listed on Appendix II, so the recommended measures for Appendix I
reservations adopted at CITES CoP4 do not even apply.230  Rather, CITES
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231. CITES, supra note 17, art. XXIII ¶ 3.
232. Id. art. VIII–IX; see Carey, supra note 188, at 1298-99, for a discussion of
enforcement problems with CITES.
233. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 509.  While the CITES Secretariat does not directly
participate in enforcement matters, it does provide general assistance to parties.  Its efforts
include: investigating infractions and other issues undermining the CITES implementation;
providing advice on implementation and enforcement; analyzing and providing parties with
information on infractions, illegal trade, and wildlife crime through the CITES Alerts;
conducting needs assessment missions to determine enforcement requirements; and
conducting training seminars on enforcement.  ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 222 (2002).  The CITES has not developed any
enforcement assistance measures specific to sharks, but it has developed other species-
specific missions relating to rhinos and tigers.  Id.  For instance, the Secretariat’s Legislation
and Compliance Unit has coordinated a Tiger Enforcement Task Force (TETF) that provides
technical advice and intelligence support to tiger range states and consumer states.  Id. at
223.  The TETF’s specific goals include: intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination;
guidance for specialized wildlife law enforcement units; and training.  Id.  The TETF is
significant because it provides a model for international and regional cooperation on
enforcement within the CITES framework. See CITES, July 9, 2001, CITES Tiger
Enforcement Task Force: Notification to the Parties [hereinafter CITES TETF], available
at http://www.cites.org/eng/notif/2001/047.shtml.
234. REEVE, supra note 233, at 225.
235. Id. at 225-27.  Parties proposed the formation of an enforcement committee in 1987,
1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994.  The Secretariat opposed each of these proposals.  While the
underlying reasons for the Secretariat’s reluctance to form such a committee are unclear, its
proffered explanations include the likely complexity, unwieldiness, and expense involved.
Id. at 226.  The creation of programs such as TETF since 1994, however, point to the
possibility that the Secretariat has become more amenable to the idea of a centralized
committee to assist parties with enforcement issues.  
simply treats the parties entering the reservations as non-parties and cannot
directly regulate their trade in those species.231
b.  Lack of Sufficient Centralized Participation in Enforcement
CITES relies on individual parties and their internally-appointed
management and scientific authorities to enforce international trade
restrictions within their borders.232  Under the current Convention text, the
CITES Secretariat is largely uninvolved in enforcement matters.233
Furthermore, the Secretariat has shown opposition to initiatives to establish
a permanent centralized enforcement working group.234  Several times since
the mid-1980s parties demonstrated an interest in establishing some form
of enforcement committee that would aid parties by providing advice,
technical assistance, and recommendations on enforcement methods; each
time, the Secretariat opposed the proposal.235  The Secretariat has sought to
ensure proper enforcement of Appendix II regulations through the
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236. ENDANGERED SPECIES THREATENED CONVENTION: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
OF CITES 53–54 (Jon Hutton & Barnabas Dickson eds., 2000).  Essentially, the significant
trade process allows the Secretariat and Animals Committee to collaborate with the
management authorities of individual parties to identify and rectify abuses of the export
permit requirements for Appendix II.  Id. at 52.  For an in depth discussion of the history,
workings, and results of the significant trade process, see REEVE, supra note 233, at 159-88.
237. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 508.
238. See, e.g., CYRILLE DE KLEMM, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT CITES
89-107 (1993), available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/002-610.html (providing general
guidelines and examples of national legislation implementing the CITES).
239. REEVE, supra note 233, at 134.  For a detailed discussion of the history and
application of the NLP, see id. at 134-47. 
240. Id.  The NLP and Art. VIII–IX required that national legislation enable the party to
designate at least one management and scientific authority, prohibit trade in specimens in
violation of the CITES, penalize prohibited trade, and confiscate illegally traded or
possessed specimens.  Id.  Parties reviewed under the NLP are divided into three categories:
category one includes parties whose legislation generally meets the requirements; category
two includes parties whose legislation generally meets some but not all the requirements;
and category three includes parties whose legislation generally does not meet the
requirements.  CITES, June 9-20, 1997, National Laws for the Implementation of the
Convention, 581, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/10/doc/E10-31.pdf.
241. CITES, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention, ¶ 12.80(a), available
at http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid12/11-20n12-80more.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
The Legislation Plan should include the legal form of the enactment, the precise scope and
content of the proposed legislation, the schedule for transmittal of the draft legislation to the
Secretariat for comments, the legislative and administrative steps needed to adopt the
legislation, and the time frame for enactment of the legislation.  Id. at ¶ 12.80(b).
242. Id. at ¶ 12.81.  Specifically, the proposed trade sanctions include “restrictions on the
significant trade process; however, insufficient funding has prevented
parties from successfully complying with its requirements.236
The lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism places a heavy
burden on developing countries to develop and implement a legislative plan
to enforce trade restrictions for species listed on the CITES Appendices
without the necessary expertise and guidance.237 CITES has sought to
mitigate the difficulty of legislation development by publishing guidelines
for legislation implementing CITES.238  In 1992, when it became apparent
that many parties still lacked sufficient national legislation, CITES adopted
the National Legislation Project (NLP) at CITES CoP8.239  The NLP directs
the Secretariat to identify those parties whose national legislation fails to
satisfy the basic requirements of Articles VIII and IX of the Convention and
report them to the CITES Standing Committee.240  Those parties are then
directed to submit a CITES Legislation Plan within a specified period of
time.241  If, at the end of that period, a party still lacks adequate legislation,
the NLP directs the Standing Committee to consider appropriate measures,
including trade sanctions against the offending party.242  While the threat of
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commercial trade in specimens of CITES-listed species to or from such parties.”  Id.
243. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 508.  This burden is quite significant: “When one
considers the difficulty encountered by the United States in maintaining adequate funding,
personnel, and training to conduct inspections of international shipments, it is no wonder
that lesser-developed nations experience infinitely greater difficulties in enforcing the
Convention.” Carey, supra note 188, at 1299.
244. CITES, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention, supra note 241, ¶
12.83(c). 
245. REEVE, supra note 233, at 272.  In comparison, other international environmental
agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
received initial contributions of $240 million and four successive replenishments totaling
over $1.5 billion.  Id. at 273.
246. CITES Secretariat, Oct. 2-14, 2004, Financing and Budgeting of the Secretariat and
of Meetings of the Conference of the Parties: Budget for 2006–2008, ¶ 10, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/13/doc/E13-08-3.pdf.
247. CITES, Oct. 2-14, 2004, Financing and Budgeting of the Secretariat and of Meetings
of the Conference of the Parties, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/13/13-01.shtml.
Furthermore, of the Secretariat’s estimated budget of $15,368,079 for program requirements
from the CITES Trust Fund for 2006–2008, the Conference of the Parties recognized only
$14,606,429.  Id. at Annex 1.  Of this, $1,584,152 is designated for legislation, enforcement,
and compliance.  Id.
248. REEVE, supra note 233, at 147.
sanctions may motivate parties to develop national legislation implementing
CITES, the financial burden of enforcement, training, and personnel
remains on the individual parties.243  The NLP directs the Secretariat to
provide legal guidance, training, and “any specific support relevant to the
fulfillment of the legislative requirements for the implementation of
CITES,” but with the caveat that such assistance is available only to the
extent of the resources available to the Secretariat.244  With available funds
including external funding equal to only $10 million annually, the
Secretariat has only meager resources with which to assist parties.245  At the
thirteenth CITES Conference of the Parties (CITES CoP13), the Secretariat
sought to increase its contributions from the parties to $15,639,279 for
2006–2008, representing an increase of 10.3%.246  However, the conference
of the parties resolved to increase the parties’ contributions by only three
percent.247  Thus, while the NLP has provided an effective “stick” through
its use of trade sanctions, its success has been hampered by its limited
ability to offer the corresponding “carrot” in the form of financial
assistance.  As of April 2002, fifty-one percent of parties reviewed under
the NLP still failed to meet all the requirements under the Convention,
indicating that the NLP has not been able to fully address the problems of
uniform legislation and enforcement.248  Even to the extent that sharks are
included on the CITES Appendices, the continuing lack of uniform
enforcement dampens the true impact of CITES protection.
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249. Carey, supra note 188, at 1308.
250. Id. at 1300-04.  In the case of the rhino, populations have suffered a ninety-five
percent decline from 1970 to 1993 in spite of having the status of an Appendix I species
since 1977.  Id. at 1301-02.
251. CLARKE, supra note 25, at 34.
252. See id. at 7-8 (discussing implications of underestimating quantity of trade in fins).
253. See CMS, supra note 18, art. I ¶ 1(c)–(e).  In addition to protecting currently
endangered migratory species, CMS also protects migratory species with an unfavorable
conservation status.  While an unfavorable conservation status refers to a much lower threat
level than endangerment, the protection offered by the CMS seeks to prevent species with
an unfavorable conservation status from advancing to endangerment.  Id. art. II ¶¶ 1-2.
254. Id. art. XX; CMS, Parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cms.int/about/part_lst/htm.
255. CMS, supra note 18, art. III–IV.
c.  Insufficient Enforcement of Trade Restrictions—The Black Market
Although not a problem with CITES itself, black market trade, which
usually arises when parties enforce trade restrictions and bans that prevent
legal trade in a commodity, hampers the CITES Secretariat’s ability to
monitor trade in listed species.249  The cases of the elephant, the rhino, the
tiger, and the parrot—all protected by CITES—demonstrate the manner in
which black market trade and poaching undermine the effectiveness of
CITES, as their populations have continued to decline because of black
market trade.250  Illicit trade also affects those shark species currently listed
on the CITES Appendices; analysis of shark fin trade data indicates the
existence of fin smuggling in Hong Kong that circumvents regulations of
legal trade in fins.251  As a result of the illegal trade in fins, which is subject
to neither monitoring nor regulation, CITES has a distorted picture of both
the true magnitude of the impact of trade on shark species covered by
CITES and the efficacy of CITES regulation of trade in those species.252
C.  CMS
1.  Structure, Scope, and Current Application of CMS to Shark
Conservation
CMS was formed to protect all migratory species from endangerment,
making no distinction about the source of the threat facing the species.253
It entered into force on June 23, 1979, and currently has 101 member
countries.254  CMS applies to migratory species that are either currently
endangered or that have an unfavorable conservation status indicating that
endangerment is likely.255  However, the parties must first vote to list the
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256. Id.
257. Id. art. III ¶ 1.
258. Id. art. I ¶ 1(e), art. III ¶ 2.  The CMS defines range as “all the areas of land or water
that a migratory species inhabits, stays in temporarily, crosses or overflies at any time on its
normal migration route.”  Id. art. I ¶ 1(f).
259. CMS, supra note 18, art. III ¶ 5.  The CMS defines range state as “any State . . . that
exercises jurisdiction over any part of the range of [a] migratory species, or a State, flag
vessels of which are engaged outside national jurisdictional limits in taking migratory
species.”  Id. art. I ¶ 1(h).
260. Id. art. III ¶ 3.
261. Id. art. IV ¶ 1.  The CMS defines an unfavorable conservation status when any of the
following conditions are not met: the migratory species is maintaining its populations on a
long-term basis, the range of the migratory species is not reduced or likely to be reduced on
a long-term basis, there is a sufficient habitat to maintain the species’ population on a long-
term basis, and the distribution and abundance of the species is consistent with historical
levels and in keeping with wise wildlife management.  Id. art. I ¶ 1(c)–(d).
262. Id. art. IV ¶ 1.
263. CMS, supra note 18, art. IV ¶ 3, art. V.
264. Id. art. V ¶ 2.
species on one of the CMS Appendices.  Like CITES, CMS offers varying
degrees of protection to endangered species through its two Appendices.256
Appendix I covers endangered migratory species.257  Species qualify for
inclusion on Appendix I if, based on reliable scientific evidence, the
Conference of the Parties determines that the species is in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.258 CMS
requires parties that are range states to prohibit the taking of species listed
on Appendix I.259  Once listed on Appendix I, the Conference of the Parties
can only remove a species when it determines, based on reliable scientific
evidence, that removal will not likely endanger the species.260
Appendix II is less stringent in its protection requirements. Appendix
II includes migratory species with an unfavorable conservation status,261
which require international agreements for their conservation and
management, as well as species with a conservation status that would
significantly benefit from an international agreement.262  CMS only requires
range states of Appendix II species to engage in agreements with each other
for the benefit of the species.263 
Even though these agreements do not offer the same level of protection
as the prohibition of takings under Appendix I, they still have great
potential to help shark species.  First, Article V of the Convention stipulates
that the agreements should cover the entire range of the species, including
those range states that are non-parties to CMS.264  If applied to sharks, this
provision could increase the possible shark conservation effort beyond the
immediate scope of CMS. Among the range states, the agreements help to
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develop cooperated conservation and management plans.265  Such
cooperation is essential to protect migratory species like sharks because
without it, range states with insufficient measures can undermine the
success of those range states with otherwise effective measures in place.
Second, the agreements call for the research and exchange of information
regarding the ecology and population dynamics of the species.266  Given the
noted lack of biological and population data currently available for many
shark species, a coordinated effort to obtain such information would greatly
benefit the shark conservation effort under CMS and other international
agreements.267  Similarly, urging that agreements provide for periodic
reviews of a species’ conservation status and the identification and
exchange of information on the threats facing that species could greatly aid
international shark conservation efforts.268  The provisions included in the
guidelines for Appendix II agreements with the greatest potential to protect
sharks are those that direct range states to coordinate in enforcing
sustainable levels of takings, suppressing illegal takings, and adopting
emergency procedures to address severe threats to the species.269  These
provisions could both support and extend beyond the conservation measures
offered by CITES, covering takings resulting in both international trade and
domestic consumption.270  Unfortunately, no agreements have yet been
drafted regarding either shark species listed on CMS Appendix II.271
2.  Problems with the Current Implementation of CMS Shark Conservation
Measures—Limited Inclusion of Shark Species
Because sharks are generally migratory species, CMS could offer wide
protection to the 197 shark species that IUCN and TRAFFIC have
recognized as endangered or threatened.272  Currently, however, CMS lists
only three shark species: the great white shark and basking shark on
Appendices I and II, and the whale shark on Appendix II.273  Furthermore,
although the Convention requires parties that are range states to Appendix
II species to form agreements to benefit the species, no agreements or
memoranda of agreement have been adopted for either the great white
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shark, the basking shark, or the whale shark.274  Thus, the protection that
CMS could provide sharks has been largely wasted.
V.  PROPOSALS
International trade poses its greatest threat to sharks in the form of
directed catch for meat and fins and as bycatch.  IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and
CMS provide mechanisms for shark conservation and management, but
their ineffective implementation prevents them from fully protecting sharks
from overexploitation.  Many of the same problems arise in the implementa-
tion of all three measures.  Both CITES and CMS suffer from insufficient
coverage of shark species.275  CITES and IPOA-Sharks both lack sufficient
resources.276  None of the agreements sufficiently enforce shark conserva-
tion measures—IPOA-Sharks because it lacks the authority, CITES because
it lacks a centralized enforcement working group to support the efforts of
member countries, and CMS because its parties have failed to create
agreements under Appendix II.277  Additionally, black market trade
undermines the effectiveness of both IPOA-Sharks and CITES trade
regulations.278  Addressing these problems will allow IPOA-Sharks, CITES,
and CMS to become more efficient, and thus more effective at protecting
sharks from the threat of international trade. 
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A.  Using RFMOs to Manage Shark Fishing
Collaborating with RFMOs could address the enforcement issues of
CITES, CMS, and IPOA-Sharks.279  RFMOs operate to bind parties on a
regional basis to manage and conserve designated fish stocks.  Through
their direct oversight of fisheries, RFMOs have a unique ability to enforce
regulations on both direct and indirect catch of sharks.280  RFMOs such as
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the fisheries
working group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) provide
examples of RFMOs involved in the management of directed shark
fisheries.281  The Inter-American Tropical Tunas Commission (IATTC) and
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) provide examples of RFMOs with the potential to manage shark
bycatch in directed tuna fisheries.282  Finally, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center (SEAFDEC) provides an example of an RFMO that,
while lacking management authority, still has the ability to provide valuable
scientific and trade information regarding various shark species.283
To a certain extent, RFMOs already contribute to international shark
conservation efforts.  For example, the fisheries working group of APEC
has published a guide on shark fisheries management techniques.284 APEC
has also participated in a regional effort to implement IPOA-Sharks and has
encouraged the development of a shark management protocol to be
administered by CMS.285 
Similarly, while IATTC and ICCAT cover tuna fisheries in the Pacific
and Atlantic Oceans, respectively, and do not have authority to regulate
directed shark fisheries, both have adopted measures to combat shark
bycatch.286  For instance, IATTC has promoted a project researching
bycatch reduction and evaluating the efficacy of current management
measures at minimizing shark bycatch.287  IATTC has also encouraged its
members to participate in a pilot program that encourages fishermen to
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develop techniques and equipment to facilitate rapid and safe bycatch
release.288  For its part, ICCAT has also adopted a recommendation
concerning shark conservation.  Specifically, the recommendation requires
both contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to release
live shark bycatch to the greatest extent possible.289  Still more significant,
the recommendation sets a strict ratio of shark fins to total weight of sharks
onboard cooperating non-contracting parties’ vessels, prohibiting such
vessels from carrying fins in excess of five percent of the total weight of
sharks onboard.290  This particular provision has the potential to effectively
combat the practice of finning shark bycatch, which has had an especially
devastating impact on shark populations.291
SEAFDEC currently consists of eleven member countries and aims to
promote fisheries development in Southeast Asia primarily through training,
research, and information services.292  Recognizing the need to implement
shark conservation in Southeast Asia, SEAFDEC has lent support to its
member countries in conducting an ad hoc study investigating shark
catches, biology, use, trade, and management in the SEAFDEC region.293
Additionally, the SEAFDEC Secretariat has coordinated with its member
countries and the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) to develop methods for species identification using either
severed fins or DNA in order to more reliably and accurately identify shark
species used in the shark fin trade.294  Finally, SEAFDEC and ASEAN have
urged their member countries to develop Shark Plans, and currently all
ASEAN member countries have at least begun work developing such
plans.295  Although SEAFDEC lacks authority to actually manage shark
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fisheries, it has made a valuable contribution to existing shark conservation
efforts through its work to increase both the quality and quantity of
available shark data. 
NAFO covers most of the fisheries resources of the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean and has a binding effect on the fisheries of its contracting parties in
that region.296  Consequently, NAFO has great potential to assist with shark
fisheries management, enforcing the conservation policies of IPOA-Sharks,
CITES, and CMS.  As part of its general enforcement measures, NAFO has
authority to monitor fisheries, require contracting parties’ vessels to record
catch by species on a daily basis and conduct both on-board and in-port
inspections.297  Additionally, NAFO has the authority to impose quotas on
both directed catch and bycatch of covered species.298  Also, NAFO has
undertaken several shark-specific measures, conducting analyses of
distribution and abundance of elasmobranchs in the Convention Area,
endeavoring to harmonize NAFO and the FAO catch data, including an
extended list of elasmobranchs for NAFO reporting, and encouraging
training in elasmobranch identification and reporting.299  The NAFO fishery
currently targets the dogfish, and although NAFO does not manage that
species at this time, given the dogfish’s particular susceptibility to
overfishing, NAFO has the potential to greatly assist shark conservation
efforts should it choose to manage the dogfish in the future.300  Even though
344 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
301. NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, supra note 297, at ch.1 art. 13.
302. For examples of NAFO’s existing quotas for currently covered species, see id. annex
1.A.
303. Report on IPOA-Sharks, supra note 147, at 3.
304. See notes 149-70 and accompanying text (discussing lack and insufficiency of
implementation of IPOA-Sharks).
305. Cf. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 514.
306. U.S. Progress Report, supra note 176, at 12.  For a list of all parties to NAFO as of
November 2006, see NAFO Members, supra note 296.
only one shark species is directly regulated by NAFO at this time, NAFO
does currently subject its contracting parties to the same shark catch
limitations as ITTAC, requiring that CP vessels release all live shark
bycatch to the extent possible, limiting the permissible ratio of shark fins to
total shark weight onboard a contracting parties’ vessel to five percent and
requiring such vessels to report all shark-catch data.301  Given that NAFO
has covered up to ten shark species in the past, should it choose to reinstate
its expanded coverage of shark species, its authority to establish and enforce
fishing quotas for covered species means that it would have the ability to
offer substantial assistance in implementing shark conservation.302  While
RFMOs have great potential to aid in shark conservation, as things currently
stand, several gaps still exist in the protection afforded to sharks.  As a
result, additional methods should also be employed to increase the efficacy
of existing shark conservation measures.
B.  Increasing Compulsion and Incentives
Because IPOA-Sharks is a voluntary measure, it lacks the authority to
directly compel shark-fishing nations to develop and implement shark
conservation measures or submit catch and trade data to the FAO.303  Shark-
fishing nations have no incentive to comply, which means that few nations
have prioritized the development of either a Shark Plan or an SAR.304
Therefore, to increase implementation of shark conservation measures at a
national level under IPOA-Sharks will require compulsion and incentives
at both the supranational and intranational level.
Sanctions imposed through regional or bilateral agreements provide a
viable option at the supranational level.  Using such agreements would
allow nations to use their market relationship to apply direct pressure on
one another to comply with IPOA-Sharks.305  For instance, NAFO has the
potential to impose sanctions for noncompliance with shark conservation
measures.306  Article XVII of NAFO’s Convention provides for the
imposition of adequate sanctions for violations of either the Convention or
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other binding measures adopted by the NAFO Fisheries Commission.307
NAFO currently has adopted only shark bycatch proposals.  Even though
directed shark fisheries are not covered, given the large role bycatch plays
in the depletion of shark populations, NAFO could still serve as a useful
tool in enforcing shark management.  Similarly, the U.S. initiated a project
in July 2000, through which APEC will facilitate regional implementation
of IPOA-Sharks.308  Using bilateral and regional agreements in this capacity
has the added advantage of facilitating shark research, monitoring, and
management, as well as the distribution of funding for these endeavors at
the regional level.309
Once a shark-fishing state has developed and implemented a Shark
Plan, it can increase compliance on an intranational level by enacting
legislation imposing criminal or civil sanctions on offending fishers.310
However, for sanctions to be effective, they would require strict
enforcement. The hypothetical legislation would require all directed shark
fisheries to register their fishing vessels with the agency responsible for
enforcing the legislation and impose quotas on both permissible levels of
directed and bycatch of sharks.  Additionally, the legislation would require
all fishing vessels to report all shark catch, whether directed or bycatch, to
ensure compliance with the quotas.  Ideally, the quotas and reporting
requirements would be accompanied by agency monitoring of fishing
vessels, with an agency official onboard to monitor compliance.  Recog-
nizing that 100% onboard monitoring may be prohibitively expensive, the
legislation could alternatively provide for dockside monitoring, with agency
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officials inspecting vessels for compliance once the vessels return to their
ports.311
C.  Tightening Enforcement
Insufficient enforcement poses another problem shared by IPOA-
Sharks, CITES, and CMS.  For IPOA-Sharks, the enforcement problem
arises because the voluntary nature of IPOA-Sharks prevents the FAO from
enforcing its implementation.312  To address this problem, IPOA-Sharks
could use CITES and CMS to monitor and enforce shark trade regulations
in proxy.  On numerous occasions, CITES has offered to monitor shark
trade and support the implementation of IPOA-Sharks.313  Specifically,
CITES could enforce IPOA-Sharks by providing: (1) mechanisms to
support the implementation of existing management measures at the
national, bilateral, and multilateral fisheries level; (2) a tool to combat
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and (3) a standardized global
monitoring system for application to trade-related measures.314  Addition-
ally, CITES could help promote the implementation of IPOA-Sharks by
requiring its member countries involved in international shark trade to
develop and implement SARs.315  For instance, under the requirement that
an export permit shall only be granted where the exporting party’s scientific
authority determines that such export will not be detrimental to the survival
of the species, CITES could require its parties seeking an export permit for
shark products to submit an SAR as part of the permitting process.316
Through the use of such a requirement, CITES could assist with the
information-gathering and assessment aspects of IPOA-Sharks, at least
regarding those specific species listed on the CITES Appendices.317
Because CITES regulates only the trade rather than the harvest of
endangered species, however, CITES would be unable to enforce the actual
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management and conservation measures called for under IPOA-Sharks.
The FAO could use CMS to enforce these aspects of IPOA-Sharks.  For
instance, APEC member countries have proposed a Pacific-wide shark
conservation and management regime that would function under the
protocol of CMS.318  Using CMS to enforce IPOA-Sharks provides the
added benefit of allowing non-party states within the migratory species’
range to participate in species-specific protocols.319
Regarding the enforcement of their own provisions, both CMS and
CITES could increase the effectiveness of their shark conservation
measures by limiting the scope of reservations that member countries can
enter for listed species.  Allowing parties to enter reservations can serve the
beneficial purpose of encouraging a party to approve the inclusion of
species on the Appendices when, absent reservations, the party’s economic
interests might otherwise lead the party to block the species’ inclusion
altogether.320  As a result, the outright elimination of reservations may
actually have a detrimental effect on shark conservation by deterring some
parties from ratifying future shark inclusion on the Appendices.  At the
same time, however, reservations create a loophole that can undermine the
catch and trade restrictions associated with the Appendices.321  CITES has
adopted the recommendation that parties entering a reservation against a
CITES Appendix I species still treat that species as though it were listed on
Appendix II, thus allowing CITES to continue to monitor international trade
in that species.322  Implementing a recommendation for CITES Appendix
II and the CMS Appendices similar to the one currently in place for CITES
Appendix I could increase the protection for sharks under both agreements.
An effective recommendation might urge reserving parties to abide by
sustainable catch models even though they are exempt from full regulation
under the Appendices.  This could serve to strike a balance between the
benefits and detriments of the current reservation provisions.  If the FAO
obtains more accurate and complete biological and catch data on sharks, it
will be able to develop a usable quota for levels of catch that would not
threaten sharks listed on either the CITES or CMS Appendices.323  This
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compromise would still hold all parties to a certain limit on shark trade
while also giving those parties with an economic reliance on shark trade a
certain degree of leeway beyond the restrictions imposed by the
Appendices.  Furthermore, it could better protect sharks by increasing
parties’ willingness to list sharks, thus maximizing their chance of inclusion
on the CITES or CMS Appendices and simultaneously increasing the level
of protection offered to listed shark species.
The effectiveness of the CITES Appendices could further improve if the
Secretariat took a more active role in training the scientific and management
authorities responsible for issuing trade permits, and thus, for enforcing the
CITES permit-issuance standards. Parties appoint their own authorities to
regulate the issuance of trade permits, with very little oversight by the
Secretariat.324  Unless the Secretariat can rely on the authorities appointed
by each party to apply the guidelines for permit issuance in good faith, the
strength of the CITES trade restrictions will suffer.325  Without uniform
training of the authorities, parties wishing to subvert the trade restrictions
for a given species could face the temptation to appoint lax authorities who
will issue trade permits liberally without properly consulting the CITES
permit-issuance standards.  In response, TRAFFIC and IUCN have
suggested that the Secretariat should expand its dialogue with the
authorities, national fisheries, and other fisheries management agencies to
improve the training of CITES authorities and, ultimately, shark manage-
ment and trade.326  Should the Secretariat decide to take a more active role
in training the authorities, it could better ensure that the authorities properly
enforce the permit-issuance standards and uphold the CITES trade
restrictions on sharks.
Creating a centralized enforcement working group would also enable
the Secretariat to increase its participation in enforcement.327  In the past,
parties have proposed the formation of such a committee, the main purpose
of which would be threefold: (1) to produce viable methods of combating
smuggling; (2) to provide or coordinate enforcement training programs; and
(3) to assist in the coordination of recording illegal wildlife activities.328
Actual enforcement would still be left in the hands of individual parties, but
the parties would have access to a centralized support system that could
assist them with developing and coordinating enforcement measures.  In
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addition to a general enforcement committee, sharks could benefit from the
creation of a species-specific enforcement task force modeled after the
Tiger Enforcement Task Force (TETF).329  Like the TETF, a hypothetical
shark-specific enforcement task force (SETF) would consist of law
enforcement officials and customs authorities from shark range states and
consumer states.  The primary actions of the SETF would include intelli-
gence gathering, analysis, and dissemination; guidance for specialized
wildlife law enforcement units; and training in anti-poaching operations,
intelligence use, targeting offenders, wildlife crime investigation, evidence
collection, and collaboration with other agencies.330  The SETF would also
enable shark range states and consumer states to develop enforcement
techniques geared toward the specific issues involved in enforcing shark
trade regulations, such as improving species identification and
implementing a unified classification system.331
Tightening enforcement of IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and CMS would
greatly increase the agreements’ ability to protect sharks from international
trade.  First, tightened enforcement would increase the quantity and
accuracy of biological and trade data, which could in turn lead to greater
coverage of shark species by highlighting the severity of the threats facing
their populations.332  Furthermore, tightened enforcement would result in a
decrease in black market trade, as countries increase their capacity to
identify, catch, and prosecute violators.333
D.  Increasing Funding for Research, Training, and Enforcement
One of the main reasons cited by shark-fishing nations for non-
implementation of IPOA-Sharks is the lack of sufficient funding for
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research, capacity-building, and training.334  Parties to CITES have faced
similar difficulties with funding for research, training, and enforcement of
conservation measures.335  Obtaining funding from the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) offers the greatest potential for addressing this problem.336
Established in 1991, the GEF helps developing countries fund
environmental protection projects and programs focused on biodiversity,
climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and
persistent organic pollutants.337  Since 1991, the GEF has provided $4.5
billion in grants and helped generate $14.5 billion in co-financing for such
projects.338  Nearly half of all the GEF projects focus on biodiversity,
including those that address issues affecting coastal, marine, and freshwater
resources.339  Any group may submit a project for consideration, provided
it meets two criteria.340  First, the project must reflect either national or
regional priorities and have the support of the countries involved.341
Second, it must improve the global environment or advance the prospect of
reducing risks to it.342  
Both CITES and IPOA-Sharks address issues affecting marine
resources, namely, promoting the conservation of various shark species.
Both agreements are eligible for the GEF funding because both seek to
prevent the population depletion of apex predators that play a vital role in
maintaining the ecological balance of the world’s oceans.343  Although
neither agreement has yet obtained funds from the GEF, at CoP13 in
October 2004, the CITES Conference of the Parties directed the Secretariat
2007] When Predators Become Prey 351
344. CITES, National Wildlife Trade Policy Reviews, ¶ d, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid13/13-74&75.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
345. CITES, Synergy between CITES and CBD, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid13/13-02_05.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).  See GEF,
O p e r a t i o n a l  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  G l o b a l  E n v i r o n m e n t  F a c i l i t y ,
http://www.thegef.org/Operational_Policies/Operational_Strategy/operational_strategy.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (stating that GEF is the financial mechanism of CMD and the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change).  See also REEVE, supra note 233, at 272-
76 (discussing the importance of collaboration with CBD in obtaining GEF funding).
346. Species are only included on the CITES and the CMS Appendices upon party-
initiated proposal and ratification.  CITES, supra note 17, art. XV ¶¶ 1–2; CMS, supra note
18, art. XI ¶¶ 2, 4.
347. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 512; Shark Fisheries and Trade in Europe, supra
note 65.
348. CASTRO ET AL., supra note 4, § 5.
349. Shark Fisheries and Trade in Europe, supra note 65.
350. Watters & Xi, supra note 28, at 514.
to submit a project proposal to the GEF, as well as to other funding
institutions, seeking financial support.344  Furthermore, the Conference of
the Parties directed the Secretariat to continue developing a Work Plan for
Implementation of Joint Activities between the CITES Secretariat and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), of which the GEF is the
financial mechanism.345  Should these endeavors prove successful, CITES
would have a greater capacity to assist parties in their implementation and
enforcement efforts.
E.  Increasing Public Education and Lobbying Efforts
Increasing public education and lobbying efforts could encourage
governments that are parties to CITES or CMS to propose the listing of
more shark species on the Appendices, thus leading to broader coverage and
protection of shark species.346  The specific aims of an education campaign
geared towards the general public should both educate the public about the
important ecological role that sharks play and promote citizen participation
in the conservation planning process.347  An education campaign should also
help to develop a conservation ethic among the general public.348  Finally,
the education campaign should aim to dispel the negative image of sharks
prevalent among the general public, increasing the public’s willingness to
help conserve shark populations.349  Combined with an increased awareness
of the detrimental impact of overexploitation in international trade, public
empathy for sharks will hopefully help to diminish the demand for shark
products.350  This combination of public awareness and empathy could also
lead to heightened citizen-based lobbying efforts.  Such a campaign could
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instance, its 2002 Project IMAGINE provided training in conservation biology and
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involved in this program were from New York, Connecticut, South Dakota, Kansas, Ohio,
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Educational and teacher-training programs are also under development in Zambia.  WCS
also conducts educational programs for students and teachers around the world in regions
where WCS field agents work, as well as formal environmental education programs in China
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355. Id.
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357. Id.
358. National Environmental Trust, Oceans in Crisis, http://www.net.org/marine/ (last
put pressure on governments to propose broader inclusion of shark species
on the CITES and CMS Appendices, as well as to implement stricter
national conservation legislation.
Several organizations have the capacity to undertake a public education
campaign promoting shark conservation, including the Wildlife Conserva-
tion Society (WCS), the National Environment Trust (NET), TRAFFIC, and
the Species Survival Network (SSN).351 WCS uses education as one of its
many tools to promote global wildlife conservation.352  It aims to foster a
positive attitude toward sustainable interaction between humans and
wildlife on both a local and a global scale.353  To that end, the Education
Division of WCS has developed several programs to educate both youths
and adults about the need to conserve the world’s wildlife resources.354
These programs seek to instill an awareness of ecological principles and an
understanding of conservation issues.355 
Like WCS, NET is a non-profit organization established to inform
United States citizens about environmental problems involving issues such
as clean air, global warming, energy, forests, marine resources, and
environmental health.356 NET acts to make citizens aware of the local
impact of national environmental problems, as well as to highlight
opportunities for citizens to engage in the policymaking process.357  In the
area of marine issues, NET has identified overfishing as a serious problem
needing the attention of the general public.358  As part of its campaign to
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involve citizens in policymaking, NET provides visitors to its website with
information regarding the national overfishing standard and the opportunity
to sign a petition urging lawmakers to protect the standard from recent
attempts to weaken it.359  Given the severe threat to shark populations posed
by overfishing, NET’s efforts could prove relevant to their protection.
Although NET only operates within the United States, it provides a model
for organizations in other countries to follow.
TRAFFIC operates on an international level to accomplish similar aims
to those of WCS and NET.  TRAFFIC seeks to ensure that trade does not
threaten either the survival of wild animals or their role in natural
ecosystems.360  To accomplish its goal, TRAFFIC has identified five goals
in its work on trade and threatened species: (1) increasing knowledge and
awareness among governments, industry, consumers, and local communities
about trade in threatened species, current regulation of such trade, and the
impact of trade on wildlife populations and biodiversity conservation; (2)
encouraging governments, industry, consumers, and local communities to
take action to reduce threats to priority species posed by trade; (3)
promoting the development and implementation of systems to monitor the
harvest and trade of threatened and potentially threatened species; (4)
contributing to the development and implementation of trade management
plans for priority species; and (5) evaluating local and national trade
controls for priority species and seeking to strengthen them.361  TRAFFIC
includes sharks among those species that it has identified as priority
species.362  In its efforts to promote shark conservation, TRAFFIC has co-
authored several reports on the implementation of shark conservation
measures for review by the CITES Animals Committee.363  These reports
have helped outline the magnitude of the threat facing many shark species
posed by trade, thus increasing parties’ awareness of the need for further
trade regulations.364
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The SSN gears its efforts specifically toward CITES implementation.365
The SSN’s educational and outreach programs provide organizations from
around the world with information necessary to participate in the CITES
process.366  For instance, the SSN publishes a newsletter that it circulates to
all CITES parties, providing summaries of recent developments regarding
CITES and trade in wildlife.367  Furthermore, the SSN conducts and
distributes scientific research and analysis to CITES parties and the general
public, allowing them to better understand the implications of various
proposals and resolutions considered for adoption by CITES.368  At CITES
CoP13 in October 2004, the SSN distributed its newsletter, urging parties
to support the proposal to include the great white shark on Appendix II.369
The combined efforts of WCS, NET, TRAFFIC, the SSN, and other such
organizations can have an effect on the success of shark conservation,
applying pressure on parties to increase coverage of sharks on the CITES
and CMS Appendices. 
VI.  CONCLUSION
Sharks are currently facing a crisis of population depletion resulting
from exploitation in international trade, with demand for shark fins alone
resulting in the death of over 100 million sharks annually.370  Although
IPOA-Sharks, CITES, and CMS all address the problem and provide inter-
national shark conservation measures to combat it, their present imple-
mentation has failed to sufficiently protect sharks.  The efficacy of all three
agreements can improve, however, by using RFMOs to manage shark
fishing; increasing compulsion and incentives to implement current
measures; tightening enforcement of all three measures; improving the
funding for training, research, and enforcement; and increasing public
education and lobbying efforts. Sharks play a vital role in maintaining
ecological balance in the world’s oceans, and their preservation requires the
international community to take action now to protect this valuable
resource.
